Max Emil Deutsch
人物简介:
Max Deutsch is Associate Professor and Head of Department in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Hong Kong.
The Myth of the Intuitive书籍相关信息
- ISBN:9780262028950
- 作者:Max Emil Deutsch
- 出版社:Cambridge, Mass. : MIT Press New York : McGraw-Hill,
- 出版时间:2015-4
- 页数:240
- 价格:USD 35.00
- 纸张:暂无纸张
- 装帧:Hardcover
- 开本:暂无开本
- 语言:暂无语言
- 适合人群:readers interested in understanding the nature of intuition, psychology enthusiasts, self-help book lovers, cognitive scientists, and anyone interested in philosophy of mind and human thought processes
- TAG:Psychology / Cognitive Science / Self-Help / Philosophy of Mind / Intuition
- 豆瓣评分:暂无豆瓣评分
- 更新时间:2025-05-18 14:56:23
内容简介:
In The Myth of the Intuitive, Max Deutsch defends the methods of analytic philosophy against a recent empirical challenge mounted by the practitioners of experimental philosophy (xphi). This challenge concerns the extent to which analytic philosophy relies on intuition—in particular, the extent to which analytic philosophers treat intuitions as evidence in arguing for philosophical conclusions. Experimental philosophers say that analytic philosophers place a great deal of evidential weight on people’s intuitions about hypothetical cases and thought experiments. Deutsch argues forcefully that this view of traditional philosophical method is a myth, part of “metaphilosophical folklore,” and he supports his argument with close examinations of results from xphi and of a number of influential arguments in analytic philosophy.
Analytic philosophy makes regular use of hypothetical examples and thought experiments, but, Deutsch writes, philosophers argue for their claims about what is true or not true in these examples and thought experiments. It is these arguments, not intuitions, that are treated as evidence for the claims.
Deutsch discusses xphi and some recent xphi studies; critiques a variety of other metaphilosophical claims; examines such famous arguments as Gettier’s refutation of the JTB (justified true belief) theory and Kripke’s Gödel Case argument against descriptivism about proper names, and shows that they rely on reasoning rather than intuition; and finds existing critiques of xphi, the “Multiple Concepts” and “Expertise” replies, to be severely lacking.
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